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1 Introduction
Despite the relevance and ubiquity of contests in the real world, contest
theory has been often criticized for its great reliance on a particular construct:
The Contest Success Function (Hirshleifer, 1989). This function is a mapping
from the e¤orts made by contenders into their probability of attaining victory
or, alternatively, their share of the contested prize. Critics argue that the
CSF is too reduced form, too much of a black-box. For instance, the widely-
used Tullock CSF (Tullock, 1967; 1980) under which winning probabilities
or shares depend on relative e¤orts might seem sensible. But there is no
apparent reason for this functional form to govern most types of contests,
ranging from interstate wars to sport competitions.1 Because of this, the
predictions of contest theory could be seen as too reliant on very specic
functional forms rather than on sound economic principles.
This view is somewhat unfair for two reasons: Firstly, because there are
other areas of Economics where very specic functional forms are often as-
sumed. Secondly, because there is an active and fruitful strand of the contest
literature which in the last few years has provided a variety of foundations
to the most frequently employed CSFs.2 This literature has even attempted
to estimate these functions econometrically.3 As a result of these e¤orts,
economists have now at their disposal a growing menu of well-founded CSFs
to chose from. The next natural question is which type of CSF is better
suited to each specic application. A systematic study of the properties of
each family of CSFs can contribute to that aim.
One family of contests assumes that winning probabilities depend on the
di¤erence of contenderse¤orts. These di¤erence-form contests were intro-
duced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991) and explored later by Baik (1998) and
Che and Gale (2000) for the case of bilateral contests. Di¤erence-form CSFs
have been shown to emerge naturally in a number of settings. Gersbach and
Haller (2009) show that a linear di¤erence-form CSF is the result of intra-
household bargaining when partners must decide how much time to devote
to themselves or to their partner. Corchón and Dahm (2010) microfound a
di¤erence-form CSF as the result of a game where contenders are uncertain
about the type of the external decider; by interpreting the CSF as a share,
they also show that the di¤erence-form coincides with the claim-egalitarian
bargaining solution. Corchón and Dahm (2011) obtain the di¤erence-form
1For excellent surveys of the contest literature see Corchon (2007) and Konrad (2009).
2These characterizations fall into four main categories: Axiomatic, stochastic,
optimally-designed and microfounded (Jia, Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2013).
3For a detailed discussion of the econometric issues involved in the estimation of CSFs
see Jia and Skaperdas (2011) and Jia et al. (2013).
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as the result of a problem where the contest designer is unable to commit to
a specic CSF once contenders have already exerted their e¤orts. Skaperdas
and Vaydia (2012) show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be derived in a
Bayesian framework in which contenders produce evidence stochastically in
order to persuade an audience of the correctness of their respective views.
Finally, Polishchuk and Tonis (2013) show that a logarithmic di¤erence-form
CSF results from using a mechanism design approach when contestants have
private information over their valuation of victory. In summary, it is fair to
conclude that di¤erence-form contests are by now well micro-founded. How-
ever, little is known about their actual properties and about how they di¤er
from the properties of the more often used ratio-form CSFs, where winning
probabilities are a function of the ratio of contenderse¤ective e¤orts.
The present paper o¤ers the rst axiomatic characterization of the family
of di¤erence-form CSFs. All the existing axiomatizations have limited them-
selves to CSFs of the ratio-form. The key property in those characterizations
is the Relative Consistency axiom. This axiom states that the success of a
group in a smaller contest should be equal to the ratio of the contenderswin-
ning probabilities in the big contest. We replace this axiom by an Absolute
Consistency axiom imposing that the di¤erence in winning probabilities of
two contenders in a smaller contest should be the same as when they are
engaged in the grand contest. We show that Absolute Consistency can over-
come some of the problems presented by the ratio-form CSFs. Our Theorem
1 shows that Absolute Consistency, together with a number of reasonable
axioms already employed in the literature, characterize a generalized version
of the linear di¤erence-form CSF introduced by Che and Gale (2000). This
family of CSFs also encompass as particular cases the ones micro-founded
in the aforementioned literature as well as the ones employed in Levine and
Smith (1995), Rohner (2006), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Gartzke
and Rohner (2011).
With our axiomatization, we help to clarify the properties that charac-
terize the families of CSFs studied in the literature. Contrary to the received
wisdom, we show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be scale invariant, i.e.
homogeneous of degree zero (Theorem 2), and that the di¤erence between
the winning probabilities of two contenders diminishes when their e¤orts
increase whilst keeping constant the di¤erence between them (Theorem 3).
These misconceptions are due to the common assumption of linear impacts,
which we dispense with, and to the common usage of the term "di¤erence-
form CSF" to refer to the logistic functional introduced by Hirshleifer (1989;
1991), under which winning probabilities are proportional to contendersex-
ponential e¤orts.
In the last part of the paper, we show that a generalization of the Relative
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Consistency axiom can characterize the family of Relative-Di¤erence CSFs
introduced recently by Beviá and Corchón (2014a). In this family of CSFs,
winning probabilities depend on the di¤erence of contenderse¤ective e¤orts
relative to total aggregate e¤ective e¤ort. This functional form can overcome
the criticisms against the di¤erence-form CSF mentioned above. Although
our results demonstrate that these criticisms are unfounded, the axiomati-
zation of the Relative-Di¤erence CSFs shows that this family of functions
presents their own advantages, advantages which make them a worthy addi-
tion to the toolkit of researchers working in contest theory.
This paper contributes to the axiomatic work on CSF pioneered by Skaper-
das (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). Later, Münster (2009), which we
follow closely, extended this characterization from individual to group con-
tests. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2009) and Rai and Sarin (2009) axiomatized
multi-investment contests, whilst Blavatskyy (2010) did the same for contests
with ties. More recently, Hwang (2012) axiomatized the family of CSF with
constant elasticity of augmentation, which encompasses the logistic and the
ratio forms as particular cases. Vesperoni (2013) and Lu and Wang (2014)
axiomatized contests producing a ranking of players instead of a sole winner.
Lu and Wang (2014) characterized success functions for contests with strict
rankings of players, whereas Vesperoni (2013) axiomatized an alternative suc-
cess function for rankings of any type. Finally, Bozbay and Vesperoni (2014)
characterized a CSF for conicts embedded in network architectures. Let us
add that in our axiomatization we make strong connections with the income
inequality literature, and in particular with the concept of absolute inequal-
ity introduced by Kolm (1976a,b) and with the family of compromise indexes
of inequality formalized by Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). The literature
on inequality measurement o¤ers valuable insights on the properties of func-
tional forms which we explicitly employ at several points of the text. In this
same spirit, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2014) have recently characterized a
new family of individual contests success functions which satisfy properties
akin to the intermediate inequality and ordinal consistency axioms employed
in the income distribution literature.
2 Axiomatization
In order to be as general as possible, we consider a society divided in K  2
disjoint groups formed by a number nk  1 of individuals each.4 Denote the
4Individual contests are a particular case of the ones studied here when groups are
formed by just one individual. All our results, except those in Section 4 which deal with
the aggregation of individual e¤orts within groups, thus apply to individual contests as
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set of groups by K: These K groups are in competition. They are engaged
in a contest which can only have one winner. Members of the contender
groups can expend non-negative e¤ort in order to help their group to win
the contest. Depending on the specic type of contest, these e¤orts can be
money, time, physical e¤ort or weapons. Denote by xk  fx1k; :::; xnkkg the
vector of e¤orts in group k and by x the vector (x1; :::;xK). For convenience
we will denote by x k the vector of e¤orts in groups other than k:
E¤orts determine the winning probability of each group according to a
Contest Success Function (CSF) pk : Rn+! R+: The function pk(x) can also
be thought of as the share of the prize associated to victory that group k
obtains. For most of the paper, we will favor the former interpretation.
Let us now state the axioms that we would like to impose on our CSF.
2.1 Two basic axioms: Let us rst present two axioms introduced by
Skaperdas (1996) in his axiomatization of CSFs for individual contests, later
generalized by Münster (2009) to group contests. These axioms are rather
natural and should thus apply to the class of di¤erence-form group contests
we study in this paper.
Axiom 1 (Probability)
PK
k=1 pk(x) = 1 and pk(x)  0 for any x and all
k 2 K:
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) Consider two generic vectors xk and x0k such
that x0k > xk. Then,
(i) pk(x
0
k;x k) pk(xk;x k); with strict inequality whenever pk(xk;x k) 2
(0; 1):
(ii) pl(x
0
k;x k) pl(xk;x k) for all l 6= k and l 2 K:
The axiom of Probability just states that the CSF generates a probabil-
ity distribution over the set of groups. The Monotonicity axiom implies that
group winning probabilities are increasing in the e¤ort of their members and
weakly decreasing in the e¤ort of outsiders. Note that this axiom is weaker
than the Monotonicity axiom employed in Münster (2009) and than the anal-
ogous one in Rai and Sarin (2009).
2.2 Subcontest axioms: The next two axioms relate to contests played
among a generic non-empty subset S  K of groups. We refer to this contest
among groups in S as a subcontest. Let us denote by pSk (x) the winning
well.
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probability of group k in the subcontest S. In particular, denote by pfk;lgk (x)
the winning probability of group k in the bilateral contest against group l:
Finally, denote by xS and x S the vector of e¤orts in the groups inside and
outside S respectively.
Axiom 3 (Independence) pSk (x) does not depend on x S; or p
S
k (x) can be
written as pSk (xS):
Independence implies that the e¤orts made by contenders outside a sub-
contest should not matter to its result. As discussed by Skaperdas (1996)
and Clark and Riis (1998), this property relates to the axiom of Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives in probabilistic individual choice. Thus, it is
a reasonable property in contests where nature determines the winner. Inde-
pendence also implies that there are no spillovers across subcontests or that
spillovers a¤ect all contenders in S equally.5
The next axiom is essential to the characterizations of the ratio-form
CSFs. Skaperdas (1996) and Münster (2009) who call it Consistency:
Axiom 4 (Relative Consistency) For any vector x, any two groups k; l 2
S and any subcontest S  K it must be that
pSk (x)
pSl (x)
=
pk(x)
pl(x)
: (1)
We discuss this axiom below. We rename it as Relative Consistency
in order to avoid confusion with the next axiom, which is crucial in our
characterization of the family of di¤erence-form CSFs.
Axiom 5 (Absolute Consistency) For any vector x and any two groups
k; l 2 S and any subcontest S  K it must be that
pSk (x) pSl (x) =pk(x)  pl(x): (2)
Let us now devote some time to compare the implications of these two
axioms. Relative Consistency has been invoked as a natural assumption.
It states that the relative success of two groups should be identical across
subcontests. However, it necessarily bounds winning probabilities away from
zero. Suppose that a contender k has zero winning probability in the big
contest, whereas group l has a winning probability " arbitrarily close to zero.
Then group k must have a zero winning probability in any subcontest S,
including the subcontest against the similarly weak group l. Hence, Relative
5We thank Luis Corchon for pointing this out.
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Consistency does not apply in contests where contenders with positive e¤orts
can lose with certainty.
The Absolute Consistency axiom allows contenders to have zero winning
probability in a natural way. Following the example above, group k would en-
joy a winning probability of 1 "
2
when ghting against the also weak group l:
Nonetheless, the Absolute Consistency axiom has its own limitations. Sup-
pose that l is instead a very strong contender but that the grand contest
involves such a large number of identically strong groups so ls winning prob-
ability is just ": In that case, Absolute Consistency again implies that the
weak group k should enjoy a winning probability of 1 "
2
in the pairwise contest
between k and l. Absolute Consistency seem thus well-suited to model con-
tests with so severe frictions that di¤erences in winning probabilities across
contenders can seldom become large.
One last word on the comparison of these two axioms. It is interesting to
note that there exists an approximate equivalence between them. Assuming
that all probabilities are strictly positive, taking logs in (1) yields
ln pSk (x)  ln pSl (x)= ln pk(x)  ln pl(x):
Knowing that the rst-order Taylor approximation of ln z around one is
z  1; and applying this to all terms in the expression above, one can obtain
precisely expression (2). Therefore, for relatively high winning probabilities,
the two axioms are approximately equivalent.
2.3 The main theorem: We are now in the position to state our main ax-
iomatization theorem. But before that, and for completeness, let us state the
theorem that characterizes the family of ratio-formCSFs.
Theorem 0 (Münster, 2009) The CSF pk(x) is continuous and satises ax-
ioms A1-A4 if and only if it can be written as
pk(x) =
hk(xk)X
l2K
hl(xl)
for any x;
where hk(xk) : R
nk
+ ! R+ is a non-negative and strongly increasing function
for each k 2 K.
The function hk(xk) is commonly known as the impact function. It aggre-
gates memberse¤orts into a measure of their group inuence in the contest.
Alternatively, it can be seen as the function determining how e¤ective play-
erse¤orts are. In this case, this function must be strongly increasing, which
implies that hk(x0k) > hk(xk) whenever x
0
k > xk.
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Let us now characterize the family of the di¤erence-form CSFs. They
emerge from replacing the Relative Consistency axiom by the Absolute Con-
sistency axiom in the previous Theorem.
Theorem 1 The CSF pk(x) is continuous and satises axioms A1-A3 and
A5 if and only if it can be written as
pk(x) =max
(
min
(
1
K
+ hk(xk)  1
K
X
l2K
hl(xl); 1
)
; 0
)
for any x; (3)
where all hk(xk) are continuous and weakly increasing functions, i.e. hk(x0k) 
hk(xk) whenever x0k > xk.
Proof. Recall that pfk;mgk (x) denotes the winning probability of group k in
the pairwise contest against group m: Then, we can rewrite (2) as
p
fk;mg
k (xk;xm) pfk;mgm (xk;xm)=pk(x) pm(x):
Note that by A3 we can write pfk;mgk (x) as p
fk;mg
k (xk;xm). Now consider
the pairwise subcontest fl;mg: Employing (2) again we get
p
fl;mg
l (xl;xm) pfl;mgm (xl;xm)=pl(x) pm(x):
After substracting these two expressions and noting that by the prob-
ability axiom pfk;mgm (xk;xm) = 1   pfk;mgk (xk;xm) and pfl;mgm (xl;xm) = 1  
p
fl;mg
l (xl;xm) we can rewrite
pk(x) pl(x) =2[pfk;mgk (xk;xm) pfl;mgl (xl;xm)]: (4)
Since this holds for any vector x and the left hand side of the expression
does not depend on xm; hence the right hand side cannot depend on xm
either. Therefore, we can rewrite the right hand side as the di¤erence of two
functions
pk(x) pl(x) =hk(xk) hl(xl): (5)
Note that hk(xk) and hl(xl) are continuous functions given that pk(x)
and pl(x) are continuous too. Adding up across all groups in K, we get
Kpk(x) 
X
l2K
pl(x) =Khk(xk) 
X
l2K
hl(xl): (6)
By the Probability axiom
X
l2K
pl(x) = 1, so this expression in addition to
the bounds imposed by the Probability axiom boils down to the expression
stated in the text of the Theorem.
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We must nally prove that each function hk(xk) is weakly increasing.
Consider a pair of vectors x0 and x such that x0 = (x1; :::;x0k; :::;xK) where
x0k > xk. That is, vector x
0 is identical to vector x except for group k: By
the Monotonicity axiom it must be that pk(x)  pk(x0) and pl(x)  pl(x0):
Combining this with the expression (5) implies that
hk(xk) hl(xl) = pk(x) pl(x)
 pk(x0)  pl(x0) = hk(x0k) hl(xl);
thus proving that hk(xk) is weakly increasing. This nalizes the proof.
The di¤erence-form group CSF in (3) relates the success of a group to
the di¤erence between its impact and the average impact of all the groups
involved in the contest. If the impact of the group is above (below) the
average impact, its winning probability must be above (below) the winning
probability that the group would be awarded under a fair lottery.
For the case of individual contests and linear and identical impact func-
tions, i.e. hk(xk) = sxk; the form in (3) boils down to
pk(x) =max
(
min
(
1
K
+
s
K
KX
l=1
(xk   xl); 1
)
; 0
)
;
which is a generalization to K-players contests of the di¤erence-form intro-
duced by Che and Gale (2000) and later employed by Rohner (2006), Besley
and Persson (2008, 2009) and Gartzke and Rohner (2011).
3 Invariance
3.1 Scale invariance
In this section, we study two other properties employed in previous axiomatic
characterizations of CSFs. These properties impose the invariance of winning
probabilities to certain changes in the prole of contestantse¤orts. The rst
one, and most-commonly used, is homogeneity of degree zero, which here we
will refer to as scale invariance.
Axiom 6 (Scale Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K;
pk(x) =pk(x):
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This axiom states that winning probabilities must remain constant to
equiproportional changes in all contenders e¤orts. Scale invariance thus
implies that units of measurement should not matter. This is a desirable
property when e¤orts are measured in money or military units (battalions,
regiments, etc). It is a property which is also satised by the indices of
relative inequality introduced by Atkinson (1970).
Münster (2009) proved that if a CSF satises axioms A1-A4 and A6, then
the impact function of all groups must be homogeneous of the same degree.
Let us now characterize the family of scale invariant di¤erence-form CSFs.
Theorem 2 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A5 and A6, then it is of the
form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) are homothetic functions satisfying
hk(xk) = k +  ln g(xk), (7)
where k and  > 0 are parameters and g(xk) is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof. By Theorem 1 and A6, and for any two groups k;m 2 K their impact
functions satisfy
hk(xk)  hk(xk) = hm(xm)  hm(xm) = 1
K
[
X
l2K
hl(xl) 
X
l2K
hl(xl)]:
Hence, because the rst two terms of the above expression do not depend
on xk or xm they must depend only on : Denote by 1 =(1; :::; 1) the vector
of appropriate length whose components are all equal to one. Then it must
hold true that
hk(xk)  hk(xk) = hk(  1)  hk(1):
Now add and substract hk(1) to the left hand side of this expression and
denote H(xk) = hk(xk)  hk(1): It can then be rewritten as
H(xk) = H(1) +H(xk):
If xk = t  1 for t > 0 then
H(t1) = H(1) +H(t1):
Dene now G() = H(1): This is a function of just one variable and
it is weakly increasing and continuous since by Theorem 1 we know already
that hk(xk) must be weakly increasing and continuous. We can then rewrite
G(t) = G() +G(t):
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This is one of the Cauchy functional equations whose only solution is
given by G(z) = ln z where  > 0 is a constant (Aczél, 1969). Now, this
implies that
H(1) = G() = ln;
and by the same token that
H(xk) = H(xk) + ln
:
Given our denition of the function H; this implies that
hk(xk) = hk(xk) + ln
:
By A6, it must be that  is identical for all impact functions. Now dene
F (xk) = expfhk(xk)g: It is clear that F (xk) is an homogeneous function of
degree : This is a function of one variable, which in turn must be a multiple
of a power function, i.e. F (s) = as (Münster, 2009; p 355): The argument of
this function can be expressed as a function gk : Rn+! R+; so we can rewrite
F (xk) = ak(gk(xk))
:
This function gk(xk) must be homogeneous of degree one since
F (xk) = 
F (xk)! gk(xk) = g(xk):
Finally, tracing back our steps
hk(xk) = lnF (xk) = ln ak +  ln g(xk) = k +  ln g(xk):
The di¤erence-form CSF has been often criticized because it seemed to vi-
olate scale invariance (Skaperdas, 1996; Hirshleifer, 2000; Alcalde and Dahm,
2007, p. 103; Corchón, 2007, p. 74). Theorem 2 proves that such criticism is
ungrounded. If the impact function is of the form (7), winning probabilities
under the family of di¤erence-form CSFs in (3) are invariant to equipropor-
tional changes in contenderse¤orts. To the best of our knowledge, this family
of scale invariant di¤erence-form CSFs has only been studied in Polishchuk
and Tonis (2013). They microfound the CSF of the form
pk(x) =max
(
min
(
1
K
+ ln g(xk)  1
K
KX
l=1
ln g(xl); 1
)
; 0
)
;
by using a mechanism design approach when contenders are individual who
have private information over their valuation of victory. For the case of group
contests, (7) is satised by the function hk(xk) = ln(
Pnk
i=1 xik)
; which we
study in more detail in Section 4.
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3.2 Translation invariance
If a CSF is dened as a function of the di¤erence between contenderse¤orts,
another natural invariance property is the following: Winning probabilities
should remain constant when the e¤ort of all contenders increase by the
same amount. This is equivalent to the following property. Let us denote by
1 =(1; :::; 1) the vector whose components are all equal to one.
Axiom 7 (Translation Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K;
pk(x+1) =pk(x):
Skaperdas (1996) and Münster (2009) used this property as an alternative
to homogeneity of degree zero in their axiomatization of the ratio-form CSFs.
Actually, translation invariance can be traced back to the income distribution
literature, and in particular to the concept of absolute inequality introduced
by Kolm (1976a,b). Absolute inequality states that the level of inequality in
a distribution should not vary when the income of every individual increases
by the same xed amount. Hence, any measure of absolute income inequality
must be translation invariant.
However, note that the Translation Invariance axiom builds in an implicit
bias against big groups. Adding a constant  to the e¤ort of each member
means that the total group e¤ort increases by nk: Bigger groups increase
more their e¤ort than smaller groups. Despite of this, Translation Invari-
ance requires that winning probabilities should remain invariant. In order to
correct this bias, we introduce the following axiom:
Axiom 8 (Group Translation Invariance) For all  > 0 and all k 2 K;
pk(x1+

n1
1; ::;xK+ 
nK
1) =pk(x):
This property implies that if the total group e¤ort increases equally across
all groups by the same positive amount  (by increasing each member e¤ort
by a x amount 
nk
), winning probabilities should not change. Group Trans-
lation Invariance thus levels the playeld: It eliminates the bias against big
groups implicitly built in the standard Translation Invariance property, a
bias which has been so far overlooked by the literature.6
Before stating our next theorem, consider the following denition:
6Such bias is not built in the Scale Invariance property: When each members e¤ort
increases in the same proportion, the total e¤ort of all groups increases in that same
proportion.
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Denition The impact function hk(xk) is said to be translatable if
hk(xk+1) =hk(xk)+k where k;  > 0:
We will refer to the scalar k as the degree of (linear) translatability of
the impact function. Translatability is analogous to linear homogeneity when
a xed amount is added to the arguments of a function. We again borrow
this concept from the income distribution literature; it is a building block
in the analysis of absolute inequality (Kolm, 1976a, 1976b; Blackorby and
Donaldson, 1980).
We are nally ready to state our theorem characterizing the family of
translation invariant di¤erence-formCSFs.
Theorem 3 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A5 and A7, then it is of the
form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) must be translatable of the same
degree  > 0. If A7 is replaced by A8, then the impact functions hk(xk) must
be translatable of degree nk.
Proof. Combining Theorem 1 with the Translation Invariance axiom,
p
fk;lg
k (xk+1;xl+1) =pfk;lgk (xk;xl)! hk(xk+1) hk(xk) =hl(xl+1) hl(xl):
Since this holds for any k; l 2 K and for any xl, the right hand side cannot
depend on xl but on  so the expression can be rewritten as
hk(xk+1) =hk(xk)+();
where () is a continuous function because it is the di¤erence of two contin-
uous function. This expression holds for any  so
hk(xk+(+ )1) = hk(xk + 1)+() =hk(xk)+()+()
! (+) =()+():
This is just the Cauchy functional equation whose only solution is of the form
() =  where  > 0 is an arbitrary real number:
The proof when A7 is replaced by Group translation invariance runs along
the same lines. It must be that
hk(xk+

nk
 1) =hk(xk)+ k(

nk
);
where  k() is also continuous because it is the di¤erence of two continuous
function. Note that for this expression to hold, it must be also that
 k(

nk
) = l(

nl
) 8k; l 2 K: (8)
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Because this holds for any  then one can write
hk(xk+
+ 
nk
1) = hk(xk +

nk
1)+ k(

nk
) =hk(xk)+ k(

nk
)+ k(

nk
)
!  k(
+ 
nk
) = k(

nk
)+ k(

nk
):
By induction, it is easy to see that this property implies that  k() =
nk k(

nk
): Hence,  k(+) = k()+ k(): This is just the familiar Cauchy
functional equation whose solution is  k() = k: This together with (8)
implies that
k
l
=
nk
nl
8k; l 2 S;
so k = nk for all k 2 K. This completes the proof.
For an example of a translation invariant di¤erence-form CSF, consider
the following impact function which we employ in a companion paper (Cubel
and Sanchez-Pages, 2014):
hk(xk) = ln (
1
nk
nkX
i=1
e kxik) 
k
k for k  0, k > 0:
This is the log of a CES function where e¤orts are exponential. The
parameter k measures the degree of complementarity of memberse¤orts.
This function is linear when k = 0. It violates A2 when k ! 1 as it
converges to the weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983).
One remark is in order at this point: In his Theorem 3, Münster (2009)
characterizes the class of ratio-form CSF which are also translation invariant.
He shows that for individual contests, this class boils down to the logistic
CSF introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991). In the literature, the logistic
form is often referred to as a di¤erence-form CSF. We see this as a misnomer.
As our axiomatization makes clear, this form does not satisfy the Absolute
Consistency axiom. Hence, in order to be precise and rigorous, we believe
that the logistic form should remain classied as an element in the family of
translation invariant ratio-form CSFs.
4 Aggregation
So far, none of the properties we have posit on CSFs is specic to group
contests. A distinctive feature of confrontations among groups is that mem-
berse¤orts must be aggregated in some form. This is modelled through the
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impact function. Further assumptions on the aggregation of e¤orts are thus
needed in order to obtain sharper characterizations. Consider for instance
the following axiom introduced by Münster (2009).
Axiom 9 (Summation) For any k 2 K consider two e¤ort vectors xk and
x0k such that
Pnk
i=1 xik =
Pnk
i=1 x
0
ik. Then it must be that
pk(xk;x k) =pk(x0k;x k):
This axiom implies that winning probabilities should remain invariant to
changes in the distribution of e¤orts within groups which leave total group
e¤ort unchanged. In the context of lobbying or rent-seeking, when e¤orts
are monetary, such assumption seems to be granted. Underlying this axiom
is the assumption that e¤orts within groups are perfect substitutes, so the
marginal productivity of individual e¤ort does not depend on the e¤ort made
by other group members.
Let us now apply this property to our characterization of the family of
di¤erence-formCSFs.
Proposition 1 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A5, A6 and A9, then it is
of the form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) satisfy
hk(xk) = k +  ln(
nkX
i=1
xik), (9)
where k;  > 0 are parameters.
Proof. Given Theorem 2, we only need to prove that g(xk) =
Pnk
i=1 xik: By
A9, we know that the impact function can be expressed just as a function of
the total sum of e¤orts in the group. Hence, it must be that
hk(xk) = hk(
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik; :::;
1
nk
nkX
i=1
xik):
This together with expression (7), implies that it is possible to write
g(xk) = (
Pnk
i=1 xik): Since (
Pnk
i=1 xik) must be homogeneous of degree one
and it is a function of one variable it must be a multiple of a power function.
Hence,
(
nkX
i=1
xik) = a
nkX
i=1
xik;
which leads to a function of the form (9) :
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The addition of Summation to our set of axioms yields a tighter char-
acterization of the impact function. Proposition 1 highlights again that the
di¤erence-form CSFs can be homogeneous of degree zero when the function
mapping memberse¤orts into group impact is logarithmic. This result can
thus respond to a criticism often made against this family of CSFs and which
was originally raised in Hirshleifer (2000)7: If the di¤erence between the ef-
forts of two contenders is kept xed, the weaker side should be more likely
to win as the e¤orts of the contenders increase; formally, pfi:jgi (xi; xi + c)
should be increasing in xi; where c > 0: This is equivalent to a positive
elasticity of augmentation (Hwang, 2012). This property is not satised by
di¤erence-form CSFs with linear impact functions, such as the logistic form
or the linear CSF in Che and Gale (2000). This is because a linear mapping
from e¤ort into impact implies that the CSF is translation invariant which
in turn implies a zero elasticity of augmentation.8 Such feature seems indeed
unreasonable in many circumstances. It is easy to see that if the di¤erence-
form group CSF satises Summation, i.e. the impact functions are as in (9),
the weaker group has a higher winning probability as the total e¤orts of the
two groups increase whilst keeping the di¤erence between the two constant.9
Let us now turn our attention to the case of translation invariant CSFs:
Proposition 2 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A5, A7 and A9, then
it is of the form (3) and the impact functions hk(xk) satisfy
hk(xk) = k +
k
nk
nkX
i=1
xik, (10)
where k; k > 0 are parameters, and k =  for all k: If A7 is replaced by
A8, then k = nk:
7It might be thought a fatal objection against the di¤erence form of the CSF that a
force balance of 1,000 soldiers versus 999 implies the same outcome (in terms of relative
success) as 3 soldiers versus 2! [...] Any reasonable provision for randomness would imply
a higher likelihood of the weaker side winning the 1,000:999 comparison than in the 3:2
comparison.(Hirshleifer, 2000, p 779)
8Translation Invariance implies pfi:jgi (xi; xi + c) = p
fi:jg
i (xi + t; xi + t + c): Hence,
@p
fi:jg
i (xi;xi+c)
@xi
= 0:
9Scale Invariance plus Summation imply that for  > 1
p1(
n1X
i=1
xi1; c+
n1X
i=1
xi1)=p1(
n1X
i=1
xi1; c+
n1X
i=1
xi1)  p1(
n1X
i=1
xi1; c+
n1X
i=1
xi1);
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity axiom.
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Proof. Again, it is possible to dene the impact function as a function ofPnk
i=1 xik but in this case, by Theorem 2, with the property that
k(
nkX
i=1
xik + nk) = k(
nkX
i=1
xik) + ;
in case A7 is invoked. Dene againHk(t) = expfk(t)g so thenHk(
Pnk
i=1 xik+
nk) = expfk(
Pnk
i=1 xik) + g = expfgHk(
Pnk
i=1 xik). and
k(
nkX
i=1
xik + ) = k(
nkX
i=1
xik) + ;
if A8 is employed instead.
Summation plus Translation Invariance imply that impact functions must
be linear. This has an additional implication. Given that the form (3) is
already separable, the equilibrium of any simultaneous-move contest with
a linear di¤erence-form CSF must be in dominant strategies under 1) risk
neutrality or 2) when pk(x) is interpreted as a winning probability. This
is because the marginal benet of e¤ort does not depend in these cases on
neither the e¤ort of other group members or the e¤ort of outsiders. It is thus
natural that Beviá and Corchón (2014b) have been able to microfound this
type of CSFs by means of dominant strategy implementation. Dominance
solvability does not apply when pk(x) is instead a share, and utilities are
non-linear as, for instance, in Levine and Smith (1995).10
One undesirable consequence of the Summation axiom is that the result-
ing CSFs can admit biases. Take for instance the linear impact in (10) and
plug it in the di¤erence-form (3). That yields
pk(x) =max
(
min
(
1
K
+ k   1
K
X
l2K
l + [
_
xk   1
K
X
l2K
_
xl]; 1
)
; 0
)
;
where
_
xk denotes the average e¤ort in group k: Note that any group with
an above-average k enjoys a head-start in the contest. The reason why the
CSF admits this type of bias is because the Summation axiom remains silent
on the relative success of di¤erent groups with the same total e¤ort. One
possibility is to modify this property in order to account for this.
Axiom 10 (Total E¤ort) For any two groups k; l 2 K such thatPnki=1 xik =Pnl
i=1 xil it must be that
pk(xk;x k) =pl(xl;x l):
10We thank Alberto Vesperoni for pointing this out.
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The axiom is a stronger version of Summation. It is actually a combi-
nation of Summation and the Between-Group Anonymity axiom of Münster
(2009). It requires that two groups with the same total e¤ort must have the
same winning probability regardless of their size. Again, this property can
make sense when e¤orts are monetary units, but not when e¤orts represent
time or when group size matters: for instance, the impact of a group of 100
people demonstrating for 10 hours may not be the same as the impact of a
group of 1000 people demonstrating for an hour.
The following Proposition shows that when Total E¤ort replaces Summa-
tion, the bias described above vanishes.
Proposition 3 If A9 is replaced by A10, then the impact functions charac-
terized in Propositions 1 and 2 must satisfy k =  for all k 2 K:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that when A10 holds impact functions, whatever
their functional form, should be identical across groups. To see this note that
hk(xk) = hk(
Pnk
i=1 xik
nk
; :::;
Pnk
i=1 xik
nk
);
because A10 also applies to changes in the distribution of e¤orts within
groups which maintain total e¤ort constant. Hence, for any vector xk it is
possible to write the impact of the group as a function of the total e¤ort, i.e.
hk(xk) = k(
Pnk
i=1 xik): Similarly for group l; that is, hl(xk) = l(
Pnl
i=1 xil):
From this it is clear to see that k and l are identical functions since by
A10 they yield the same value whenever they are applied to the same argu-
ment. Hence, impact functions (9) and (10) must not di¤er across groups
and k =  for all k 2 K:
Total E¤ort eliminates biases in favor of certain groups. Denoting by Xk
the sum of e¤orts within group k, a particularly interesting CSF satisfying
the Total E¤ort axiom together with Scale Invariance is
pk(x) =max

min

1
K
+  ln
Xk
GX
; 1

; 0

;
where GX = (
Y
K
l=1Xl)
1
K is the geometric mean of groupstotal e¤orts.
5 Relative di¤erence functions
In the previous sections, we have seen that the criticisms often leveled against
di¤erence-form CSFs rest critically on the implicit assumption of a linear re-
lationship between e¤orts and impact. Within that framework, some authors
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have proposed new di¤erence-form CSFs which can overcome these problems.
Alcalde and Dahm (2007) and Beviá and Corchón (2014a) introduced new
functional forms where the di¤erence in e¤orts is divided by some aggregate.
This is again reminiscent of the income inequality literature, and in par-
ticular, of the family of compromise indices, which result from dividing an
absolute index by the per capita income of the distribution and are, therefore,
scale-invariant (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980).11
Let us now characterize axiomatically the relative-di¤erence contest suc-
cess function (RDCSF) introduced in Beviá and Corchón (2014a). Before
proceeding, let us mention that their family of CSFs admits three parame-
ters so here we just characterize one subset of them which, as it turns out,
emerges from a natural generalization of the Relative Consistency axiom.
Axiom 11 (A¢ ne Relative Consistency) For any vector x, any subcon-
test S  K and any two groups k; l 2 S it must be that
 + pSk (x)
 + pSl (x)
=
 + pk(x)
 + pl(x)
; (11)
where  2 [0; 1];
Note that when  = 0 this axiom coincides with the Relative Consistency
axiom. We bound the parameter  to be in the interval [0; 1] for the following
reason. Taking logs on both sides of (11) yields
ln( + pSk (x))  ln( + pSl (x))= ln( + pk(x)) ( + ln pl(x));
which after repeatedly applying the rst-order Taylor approximation around
 yields again (2). Therefore, A¢ ne Relative Consistency and Absolute Con-
sistency become equivalent properties when winning probabilities are close
to : Because of that, zero and one are the natural limits to the value of this
parameter.
We are now in the position to state a new Theorem characterizing a
RDCSF belonging to the family introduced in Beviá and Corchón (2014a).12
11The equivalence between inequality indexes and CSFs requires a normalization rst.
Note that when all impacts are identical, winning probabilities are all equal to 1K whereas
any inequality index should be equal to zero when all incomes are identical . Now, taking
this into account, observe that substracting 1K from the di¤erence-form in (3) and dividing
by the per capita impact 1K
X
l2K
hl(xl) yields the RDCSF in (12) minus 1K when  =
K 1
K :
12Specically, for the case s = 1 and  = ( + 1K )(K   1): See their equation (15).
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Theorem 4 The CSF pk(x) is continuous and satises axioms A1-A3 and
A11 if and only if it can be written as
pk(x)=max
8>><>>:min
8>><>>:
1
K
+ (K + 1)
hk(xk)  1K
X
l2K
hl(xl)X
l2K
hl(xl)
; 1
9>>=>>; ; 0
9>>=>>; for any x s.t. x 6= 0;
(12)
where  2 (0; 1] and the impact functions hk(xk) are continuous and weakly
increasing functions.
Proof. Take three contender groups k; l and m: By A11 we know that
 + pk(x)
 + pm(x)
=
 + pk;mk (x)
 + pk;mm (x)
=
 + pk;mk (xk;xm)
1 +    pk;mk (xk;xm)
 + pl(x)
 + pm(x)
=
 + pl;ml (x)
 + pl;mm (x)
=
 + pl;ml (xl;xm)
1 +    pl;ml (xl;xm)
;
where the last equalities hold because of A3. Dividing these expressions
yields
 + pk(x)
 + pl(x)
=
+pk;mk (xk;xm)
1+ pk;mk (xl;xm)
+pl;ml (xl;xm)
1+ pl;ml (xl;xm)
:
Now x xm = m 6= 0. It is thus possible to write
hk(xk) =
 + pk;mk (xk;m)
1 +    pk;mk (xl;m)
; (13)
so then
 + pk(x)
 + pl(x)
=
hk(xk)
hl(xl)
:
Adding up across all l 2 K and then solving for pk(x) yields
pk(x) = (K + 1)
hk(xk)X
l2K
hl(xl)
  ; (14)
which, after some rewriting and after applying the necessary bounds due
to A1, becomes expression (12). We nally need to prove that the impact
functions hk(xk) are strongly increasing. We leave out the case  = 0 because
then A11 becomes A4 and that case is covered by Theorem 1 in Münster
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(2009). For the case  2 (0; 1] take two vectors x0k and xk. By A2 it must
be that pk;mk (xk;m) < p
k;m
k (x
0
k;m) when p
k;m
k (xk;m) 2 (0; 1): Combining this
with the expression (13) implies that hk(x0k) > hk(xk): Inequalities are weak
if pk;mk (xk;m) 2 f0; 1g: Hence, hk(xk) is a weakly increasing function. This
nalizes the proof.
This Theorem shows that the family of RDCSF is characterized by the
axiom of A¢ ne Relative Consistency. Given that Relative Consistency is a
particular case of this property for  = 0; this implies that the ratio-form
CSFs is a particular case of the RDCSF:
Let us now characterize the RDCSF satisfying the two invariance proper-
ties considered in Section 3.
Proposition 4 If a CSF satises axioms A1-A3, A6 and A11, then it is of
the form (12) and all the impact functions hk(xk) are homogeneous of degree
 > 0: If A6 is replaced by A7 then all the impact functions satisfy
hk(xk + 1) = e
hk(xk), (15)
for all  > 0 and where k;  > 0 are parameters.
Proof. A6 implies that pk(x) = pk(x): Recall that (12) can be written as
in (14). Assume for the time being that xk 6= 0: It is then possible to write
 + pk(x)
 + pk(x)
=
hk(xk)
hk(xk)
=
hk(1)
hk(1)
=
 + pk(1)
 + pk(1)
:
From here the proof can just continue identical to the one for Theorem 2
in Münster (2009) in order to show that hk(xk) = 
hk(xk). For the case
where xk = 0 we need to be a bit more careful. Assume that for some group
m it holds that xm 6= 0: Then it must be that
pk(0;x k) = max
8>><>>:min
8>><>>:(K + 1)
hk(0)
hk(0) +
X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl)
  ; 1
9>>=>>; ; 0
9>>=>>;
= max
8>><>>:min
8>><>>:(K + 1)
hk(0)
hk(0) + 

X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl)
  ; 1
9>>=>>; ; 0
9>>=>>;
= pk(0; x k):
If pk(0;x k) 2 (0; 1) then it must be that hk(0) = 0 because
X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl) >
0: If pk(0;x k) = 0 then A6 implies that pk(0; x k) = 0 so for any  > 0 it
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must be that
K + 1  

hk(0)X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl)
 minf; 1g:
If hk(0) > 0 then the left hand side of the above expression is strictly
positive so it is possible to nd a value of  arbitrarily close to zero which
contradicts the above expression. Hence it must be that hk(0) = 0: A similar
argument can be used if pk(1;x k) = 0:
Regarding the second part of the Proposition, using A7 is possible to
write
 + pk(1+ x)
 + pk(x)
=
hk(1+ x)
hk(x)
=
hk(1)
hk(0)
=
 + pk(1)
 + pk(0)
:
From here, the proof continues identically to the one for Theorem 3 in
Münster (2009) only if hk(0) > 0. Let us show that this is the case. Assume
instead that hk(0) = 0: Applying A7 implies that for any  > 0
pk(0;x k) = 0
= max
8>><>>:min
8>><>>:(K + 1)
hk(1)
hk(1) +
X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl + 1)
  ; 1
9>>=>>; ; 0
9>>=>>;
= pk(1;x k + 1):
For this expression to hold it must be that for any  > 0
hk(1)  
K + 1  
X
l 6=k;l2K
hl(xl + 1):
Because the impact functions are increasing, the summation at right hand
side of the above expression is bounded from below by hm(xm) > 0. Because
impact functions are also continuous, then there exists a value of  arbitrarily
close to zero which leads to a contradiction.
As we have reiterated, the main criticisms made against the di¤erence-
form CSF characterized in (3) can be overcome with the appropriate choice
of the impact function. It is thus not necessary to resort to the RDCSF in
order to restore scale invariance. Notwithstanding, this family of CSFs has
its own advantages. Let us discuss two of them. First, the RDCSF is not
subject to the "zero probability problem" su¤ered by the CSFs satisfying
the Relative Consistency axiom. Simple inspection of (11) shows that if
pk(x) = 0 the axiom does not force group k to have zero winning probability
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in all subcontests in which k can participate. Secondly, RDCSF is less rigid
than the family of CSFs satisfying Absolute Consistency. Take again our
example in Section 2.2, where group k is very weak so pk(x) = 0 whereas
group l is very strong but pl(x) =" because there is a large number of equally
mighty groups in the grand contest. In this case, A¢ ne Relative Consistency
implies that in the pairwise contest between k and l, the weak group k
has a winning probability of pfk;lgk (x) =
(1 ")
2+"
; which ranges between zero
and 1 "
2+"
; which is always smaller that the value that pfk;lgk (x) would take if
Absolute Consistency were imposed instead. Therefore, changes in winning
probabilities across subcontests seems more reasonable when CSFs satisfy
A¢ ne Relative Consistency than when they satisfy Absolute Consistency.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have o¤ered the rst systematic study of group contests
where winning probabilities depend on the di¤erence between their e¤ective
e¤orts. Our axiomatic characterization encompassed both absolute and rel-
ative di¤erence-form CSFs. This axiomatization employed some tools from
the inequality measurement literature.
We aimed to provide a complete cartography of this family of CSFs.
We demonstrated that, contrary to what has been argued in the literature,
di¤erence-form CSFs can be homogeneous of degree zero, and that they do
not force di¤erences in winning probabilities to remain invariant when ab-
solute di¤erences in raw e¤orts remain constant. In addition, we were the
rst to ag up that the Translation Invariance property builds in an implicit
bias against big groups which should be corrected. In this process, we argued
that the logistic function (Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991), although often referred to
as a di¤erence-form function, does not actually belong to this family. For us,
this label should be reserved only to CSFs satisfying the Absolute Consis-
tency axiom, which the logistic form does not satisfy.
Finally, our axiomatization of relative-di¤erence CSFs showed that this
family of functions presents its own distinctive advantages. One of these
advantages, which this family shares with the family of Absolute Di¤erence
CSFs, is that having a zero winning probability in the grand contest does
not bound to zero the probability of winning smaller contests. This might
be adequate in Political Economy applications where a party may have no
chances in a general election but a large probability of winning a local one.
Di¤erence-form CSFs have not been employed in the contest literature as
often as other functional forms. We hope that, by clarifying its properties,
our axiomatization will persuade researchers in the area to include this family
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of CSFs in their toolkit. Of course, our characterization is normative and
leaves out strategic interactions. Che and Gale (2000) showed that their
linear di¤erence-form CSF often leads to mixed-strategy equilibria and that
any equilibrium in pure-strategies involves that at most one contender is
active. One possible next step would be to check whether the equilibria
of contests under the generalized di¤erence-form CSF axiomatized here still
presents such features. In addition, this form implies the separability on
contenderse¤orts, leading to dominant strategy equilibria when impacts are
linear. We explore these issues in a companion paper (Cubel and Sanchez-
Pages, 2014).
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